We suggest a model in which theories are ranked given various databases. Certain axioms on such rankings imply a numerical representation that is the sum of the log-likelihood of the theory and a fixed number for each theory, which may be interpreted as a measure of its complexity. This additive combination of log-likelihood and a measure of complexity generalizes both the Akaike Information Criterion and the Minimum Description Length criterion, which are well known in statistics and in machine learning, respectively. The axiomatic approach is suggested as a way to analyze such theory-selection criteria and judge their reasonability based on finite databases.
Introduction
The selection of a theory based on observations is a fundamental problem that cuts across several disciplines. Finding the "right" way to select theories given evidence is of interest to philosophy of science, statistics, and machine learning.
Two fundamental criteria for the selection of theories are simplicity and goodness of fit. The preference for simple theories is well known, and is often attributed to William of Occam (see Russell, 1946) . But the notion of simplicity is not always easy to define. Goodman's grue-bleen paradox (Goodman, 1955) may be interpreted as pointing out that the notion of simplicity will invariably depend on the language one uses. (See Sober, 1975 .) Yet, given the potential freedom one has in defining a language, and consequently, simplicity, it is often surprising how much agreement one finds between the simplicity judgment of different people. For example, most people tend to agree that, other things being equal, a theory with fewer parameters is simpler than a theory with more parameters, or that a theory with a shorter description is simpler than a theory with a longer one. Whereas such claims depend on an agreement about a language, or a set of languages within which simplicity is measured, they do not seem to be vacuous statements. The suggestion that people tend to prefer simple theories to more complex ones can therefore be a meaningful empirical claim.
However, simplicity can only serve as an a-priori argument for or against certain theories. How well a theory performs in explaining observed data should certainly also factor into our considerations in selecting theories. Sometimes, one may categorize theories dichotomously into theories that fit the data as opposed to theories that are refuted by the data, and then choose the simplest theory among the former. But in most problems in the social sciences, as well as in everyday life, theories are never categorically refuted. In these fields theories tend to be formulated statistically. Therefore, a theory typically cannot be refuted by observations. Instead, theories can be ranked according to their goodness of fit, namely, the extent to which they match observations. In particular, the likelihood principle suggests to rank theories according to their likelihood function, that is, the a-priori probability that the theory used to assign to the observed data before these data were indeed observed.
Viewed from a statistical point of view, the likelihood principle is a fundamental idea that neatly captures the notion of "goodness of fit" while relying on objective data alone. Choosing the theory that maximizes the conditional probability of the actually observed sample does not rely on any subjective a-priori preferences, hunches, or intuitions of the reasoner. But for that very reason, the maximum likelihood principle cannot express preferences for simplicity. Due to this limitation, the applicability of this criterion is restricted to set-ups in which the set of possible theories is a-priori restricted to a given class, within which complexity considerations might be ignored. When no such a-priori restriction is available, the maximum likelihood principle is insufficient. More explicitly, if one considers all conceivable theories, one will always be able to find a theory that matches the observations perfectly. Such a theory will obtain the maximum conceivable likelihood value of 1, but it is likely to be "overfitting" the data. We tend not to trust a theory that matches the data perfectly if it appears very complex. Thus, maximum likelihood does not suffice to describe the totality of considerations that enter the theory selection process.
We are therefore led to the conclusion that a reasonable criterion for the selection of theories based on observations has to take into account both the likelihood of a theory, or some other measure of goodness of fit, and its simplicity, or some other a-priori preference for some theories versus others.
1 Indeed, combinations of likelihood and some measure of complexity are well known in the literature on statistics and on machine learning. Specifically, linear combinations of the logarithm of the likelihood function and a complexity measure appeared in both literatures. Akaike Information Criterion (AIC, Akaike, 1974) , suggests that, when comparing different statistical models, one adopts a model a that obtains the highest value for
where L(a) is the likelihood function of a, and k is the number of parameters used in model a.
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The machine learning literature often adopts Kolmogorov's complexity measure (Kolmogorov, 1963 , 1965 , Chaitin, 1966 , which suggests that the complexity of a theory be measured by the minimal length of a program (say, a description of a Turing machine) that can be used to generate the theory's predictions. Solomonoff (1964) suggested to use such a complexity measure as a basis for a theory of philosophy of science. Related concepts are the Minimal Message Length (MML, Wallace and Boulton, 1968) and the Minimum Description Length (MDL) of a theory. Recent applications often trade-off a theory's likelihood with its simplicity by considering criteria of the form log(L(a)) − MDL where MDL is the minimum description length. (See Wallace and Dowe, 1999, and Wallace, 2005 for a more recent survey.) Clearly, there could be many ways to trade-off a theory's likelihood with its complexity. Indeed, Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC, also known as BIC), suggests that the number of parameters be divided by the logarithm of the number of observations. How should we judge among such criteria? How should we trade off likelihood and complexity?
The present paper addresses this question in an axiomatic way. Our axiomatic approach does not presuppose particular measures of goodness of fit or of likelihood, let alone a particular combination thereof. Rather, we consider an abstract problem in which observations and theories are formal entities that are a-priori unrelated, and are also devoid of any explicit content or mathematical structure. In particular, no statistical model is a-priori assumed, and no likelihood functions are given. We only assume that a reasoner can rank theories given various databases of observations. Such rankings are modeled as weak orders (binary relations that are complete and transitive), and interpreted as "at least as plausible as" relations. We formulate certain conditions, or "axioms" on these weak orders, which can be viewed as notions of internal consistency: the axioms relate the rankings of theories given different databases of observations. The axioms do not restrict the inferences the reasoner may draw from any particular database, but they do exclude certain patterns of plausibility rankings given different databases. The main result of this paper is that the axioms imply the existence of a statistical model, providing the conditional probability of each observation given each theory, and a constant for each theory, such that, given every possible database, theories are ranked according to the sum of the constant and their log-likelihood function.
Formally, theories are elements of a set A and observations -of a set X, where neither set is endowed with any mathematical structure, and the two are a-priori unrelated. A database I is a function I : X → Z + , (where Z + stands for the non-negative integers) with P x∈X I(x) < ∞, and I(x) is interpreted as the number of times an observation x has appeared in the database described by I. We assume that, for each such database I, the reasoner has a ranking over theories, % I ⊂ A × A, where a % I b is interpreted as "given the observations in database I, theory a is at least as plausible as theory b". We impose several axioms on the collection of rankings {% I } I , that imply the following representation: for every theory a there exists w(a) ∈ R and for every observation x, also a number v(a, x) ∈ R, such that, for any database I, and any two theories a, b ∈ A, a % I b iff
In this representation, one may interpret v(a, x) as the log of Pr(x|a), and then P x∈X I(x)v(a, x) is simply the log-likelihood of the theory a given the database I. The constant w(a) reflects some a-priori bias for the theory a, and it can be interpreted as a measure of the theory's complexity.
The axiomatic treatment may serve as a reason to select additive likelihoodcomplexity trade-offs such as AIC and MDL, and perhaps to prefer them over other criteria that do not satisfy the axioms. Conversely, one may find the axioms uncompelling, and suggest that a rejection of the axioms would lead to a rejection of these criteria in favor of other criteria. In other words, the axiomatic treatment allows a discussion of various criteria at a level of abstraction that helps us see their merits and flaws.
This paper may be viewed as a contribution to the axiomatic analysis of statistical techniques. In Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003) we provided an axiomatization of kernel estimation of density functions, kernel classification, as well as of maximum likelihood rankings.
3 Billot, Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler (2005) and Gilboa, Lieberman, and Schmeidler (2006) axiomatize kernel estimation of probabilities. One rationale for these papers is the attempt to ground statistical and machine learning methods in axiomatic derivations. The axiomatic approach offers consistency criteria that may help one select theories based on their abstract properties. Such criteria might be of interest especially when finite samples are concerned, and asymptotic behavior may not suffice as the sole guide for the selection of theories.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model and the result. The following one is devoted to a general discussion. Proofs and related analysis are to be found in an appendix.
Model and Result
Let X be the set of (types of) observations. The set of databases is defined as
A database I ∈ D is interpreted as a counter vector, where I(x) counts how many observations of type x appear in the database represented by I. Algebraic operations on D are performed pointwise. Thus, for I, J ∈ D and k ≥ 0, I + J ∈ D, and kI ∈ D are well-defined. Similarly, the inequality I ≥ J is read pointwise. We denote
Let A be the set of theories. For I ∈ D, % I ⊂ A × A is a binary relation on theories, where a % I b is interpreted as "given the database I, theory a is at least as plausible as theory b". The asymmetric and symmetric parts of % I , Â I and ∼ I , respectively, are defined as usual.
We now turn to describe our conditions. The first three, A1-A3, are "axioms" on the plausibility rankings. They are supposed to suggest appealing properties of the theory-selection criterion. 4 The last two are richness conditions. These conditions have no claim to suggest desirable properties of such criteria. Rather, they are conditions on the set-up of the model needed for our result to hold. For simplicity of notation, we refer to the richness conditions as "A4" and "A5", despite the fact that they are not proposed as "axioms". Correspondingly, axioms A1-A3 are also necessary for the representation (1), while A4-A5 are not. Weakenings or alternatives to A4 and A5 that will give rise to the representation (1) will certainly be of interest.
(See the discussion in the appendix.)
Observe that the only relation between the sets A and X is provided indirectly by the set of rankings {% I } I∈D . In sub-section 3.1 we discuss the pairs of sets (A, X) that may be appropriate for our model. For the time being, the reader may bear in mind the classical statistical set-up, in which theories are simply distributions over observations. A1 Order: For every I ∈ D, % I is complete and transitive on A.
A1 is a standard axiom in decision theory. Transitivity is typically considered to be a basic axiom of rationality: if theory a is at least as plausible as theory b, and the latter -at least as plausible as theory c, one would find it hard to argue that c is more plausible than a.
Completeness requires that any two theories can be compared for their plausibility, given any database. It is a demanding axiom indeed. Typically, completeness is justified by necessity: once a database is given, the reasoner is asked to make some choice regarding which theory she will use for prediction. The completeness axiom requires that this choice be brought forth and explicitly modeled. (See further discussion in sub-section 3.1 below.) A2 Re-Grouping: Suppose that I, J, K, L ∈ D are such that I +J = K +L. Then there are no a, b ∈ A, for which a % I b and a
The re-grouping axiom is a version of the "combination" axiom in Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003) . The latter implied that a % I b and a % J b would necessitate a % I+J b. That is, a conclusion (theory a is at least as plausible as theory b) that is warranted given two disjoint databases separately should also be warranted given their union (modeled as I + J). This axiom is satisfied by maximum likelihood rankings. But it may be too restrictive when complexity considerations are introduced. Specifically, a simple theory a may be considered more likely than a more complex theory b given each of the databases I and J, separately, even if b fits the data in each database better. But when the two databases are considered in conjunction, the better fit provided by b may overwhelm the complexity considerations, rendering b more plausible than a given I + J. The re-grouping axiom we impose here considers a fixed set of observations, given by I + J = K + L. The axiom states that the same set of observations cannot be partitioned twice into two disjoint databases, such that in one partition both databases render a at least as plausible as b, and in the other -one renders b at least as plausible as a, and the other -strictly more plausible. We defer further discussion of this axiom to sub-section 3.1 below.
A3 Archimedean Axiom: Assume that I, J ∈ D and a, b ∈ A satisfy b Â J a and a % J+I b. Then for every K ∈ D there exists l ∈ N such that a Â K+lI b.
The antecedent of the Archimedean axiom assumes that, complexity considerations aside, database I renders a more likely than b: starting from b Â J a, the addition of the observations in I reverses the plausibility ranking. Since complexity considerations and other a-priori biases for one theory over another do not change when we compare the database J to the database J + I, the switch from b to a can only be attributed to the fact that theory a provides a better fit to the observations in I than does theory b. In this case, the axiom demands that, for every database K, the addition of sufficiently many replicas of database I should make a more plausible than b. That is, if a fits the data I better than does b, and we observe more and more databases identical to I, eventually we should prefer theory a to theory b, even if initial data (embodied in K) and complexity considerations originally gave preference to b.
The last two axioms, or conditions, are not justified on a-priori grounds. As mentioned above, they are used only because of the mathematical necessity and may well be weakened or replaced by other axioms. Having said that, we do not find them conceptually objectionable. The first states that, for every list of four theories and any database, there is a possible continuation of the database that would rank the theories according to the order in the list. It excludes, for instance, a situation in which one theory is always more plausible than another, regardless of the database. The second condition requires that for every database and every three theories there is a continuation of the database that renders the three theories equally plausible. We can finally state our main result.
Theorem 1 Let there be given X, A, and {% I } I∈D as above. Assume that {% I } I∈D satisfy A1-A5. Then there is a matrix v : A × X → R and a vector w : A → R such that:
, Furthermore, in this case the matrix v and the vector w are unique in the following sense: (v, w) and (u, y) both satisfy ( * ) iff there are a scalar λ > 0, a matrix β : A × X → R with identical rows (i.e., with constant columns) and a number δ such that u = λv + β and y = λw + δ.
Discussion

The Axioms
We find that the most demanding axioms, conceptually speaking, are the completeness and the re-grouping axioms. We discuss them in turn.
While the completeness axiom is standard in decision theory, it is important to note that it implicitly imposes certain restrictions on the pairs (A, X) considered in our model. As mentioned above, no a-priori restrictions are imposed on these sets. But the assumption that, given any database of observations from X, the reasoner can rank any two theories in A, implicitly restricts the pairs of sets considered in our model. In particular, given a database that consists of a single observation, the reasoner is assumed to have a complete order over all theories. For a rational reasoner to have such an order, theories should be somehow related to observations. One example in which theories and observations are closely related is when theories are modeled as subsets of observations, that is, when a theory is identified with the observations that are compatible with it, as opposed to the observations that refute it. Much of the discussion in the philosophical literature can be couched in these terms. In this example the completeness axiom appears reasonable. In particular, given a single observation, it is natural to rank as most plausible all the theories that are compatible with it, perhaps in a decreasing order of complexity, and to rank all the theories that are refuted by the observation as least plausible.
Another example in which the completeness axiom appears reasonable involves theories that are distributions over observations. This example may be viewed as generalizing the first, where each theory does not merely classify observations into "possible" and "impossible", but also numerically ranks their degree of possibility. Considering a single observation, one may, for instance, rank theories based on their likelihood function, perhaps coupled with other considerations.
Our model is not restricted to these examples, and it may apply to more general set-ups, as long as one finds a way to rationally rank theories given databases. But the model should not be applied if, say, given a single observation, one has no rational, justified way to rank theories.
The statement of the re-grouping axiom (A2) might bring to mind Simpson's paradox (Simpson, 1951 ), which appears to constitute a violation of the axiom. Consider, for example, the famous Berkeley Sex Bias Case, in which the percentage of men admitted to graduate school is higher than the percentage of women admitted, while the converse is true for each department separately. (Historically, the converse was true in almost all departments. 5 )
For simplicity, assume that there are only two departments. In this case, splitting the database by departments would yield two databases (say, I and J) in each of which women appear to be favored to men. By contrast, splitting the same database randomly would yield two other databases (say, K and L), each supporting the opposite conclusion.
However, this application of our model is inappropriate, because the single observations are not directly related to the theories discussed. In fact, in this example even the completeness axiom is problematic: given a single case, be it of a man or a woman, admitted or not, it is not at all obvious how one should rank two theories such as "women are favored at admission" vs. "men are favored at admission". These theories are about comparisons of sets of observations (to be precise, comparisons of percentages of admitted applicants within two sub-populations), and they do not directly say anything about a particular observation.
To deal with the Berkeley Sex Bias Case, one would have to consider "observations" that are directly relevant to the theories. For example, an observation might be a pair of candidates that are similar in all respects apart from their gender, one of whom was admitted by a certain department and the other -denied admission by the same department. Such an observation would indeed constitute a direct evidence of unequal treatment of the genders. But it is easy to see that Simpson's paradox cannot be replicated using such observations of disjoint pairs, as the paradox relies on unequal proportions of women and men applying to different departments.
Similar difficulties with the re-grouping axiom might arise when one considers various theories that are not about specific observations, but rather about patterns of observations. For instance, if one is to judge whether a sequence of observations is random, one may easily construct counter-examples to the re-grouping axiom. Again, in such examples the theories discussed do not say anything about specific observations, only about patterns thereof. This is highlighted by similar difficulties with the completeness axiom applied to databases of single observations. Having but a single observation, one cannot rationally judge whether it comes from a random sequence or not.
To conclude, our model should only be applied to theories and observations that are directly related, in the sense that every theory, is relevant to every observation. Differently put, every single observation should have meaningful implications about the plausibility of the theories. When attention is restricted to such applications, the completeness axiom is not too demanding, and the re-grouping axiom appears reasonable.
Methods of Classical Statistics
It appears that maximum likelihood is a reasonable criterion only when the set of theories is a-priori restricted in one way or another. For instance, one may face a regression problem and consider only linear or quadratic theories. But in this case the set of theories under discussion is subjectively chosen. That is, the model does not purport to explain why the particular set of theories -say, linear -was chosen to begin with. Assuming the model as given, likelihood maximization offers an objective ranking of theories. But the choice of the model itself remains subjective, and sometimes arbitrary.
Statistical theory offers a variety of tools to cope with the problem of overfitting data as a result of likelihood maximization. The trade-off between a good fit and the theory's complexity is familiar from model selection criteria in parametric set-ups (such as adjusted R 2 , LASSO, Ridge Regression, and others) as well as in non-parametric set-ups (Akaike Information Criterion, BIC, etc.). The present paper addresses this question axiomatically, describing an inductive learning process that does not impose arbitrary restrictions on the set of theories.
Bayesian Analysis
The ranking by (1) cannot fail to remind one of the Bayesian approach, according to which the reasoner has a probability measure over a space of theories, and theories are ranked by their posterior probabilities. Indeed, suppose that the set of theories is countable, and that a Bayesian reasoner has a prior over theories given by q(a) ≡ exp(w(a)) and conditional probabilities given by p(x|a) = exp(v (a, x) ). Then the expressions in (1) will be proportional to the logarithms of the posterior beliefs of the Bayesian rea-soner (for theories a and b, respectively, given database I). In particular, a reasoner who provides plausibility rankings that can be represented by (1) will be indistinguishable from a Bayesian reasoner with prior q, who provides plausibility rankings by comparing posterior probabilities. However, our approach differs from the Bayesian approach in several ways. First, the numbers q(a) in our set-up are not unique. Indeed, it is readily seen that they can all be multiplied by a positive constant without changing the rankings in (1). A Bayesian prior over countably many theories dictates the probability of all subsets of theories. By contrast, because of the nonuniqueness of q in our model, it does not apply to sets of theories, and it is meaningless to sum q values.
This distinction is especially pronounced if the set of theories is not countable, as would be the case if one considers all conceivable theories. In this case, the Bayesian prior probability of each specific theory will most likely be zero. Hence, q(a) cannot be interpreted as the probability of theory a. An interpretation as a "density" function would make sense only if there is a natural way to integrate over theories, but this is not the case when all theories are concerned. In this case, the interpretation of q(a) as a parameter that measures the a-priori plausibility of the theory is quite different from the "probability" of the theory.
A related difference between our approach and the Bayesian one is the amount of information the reasoner is required to provide. In our model, only ordinal rankings of specific theories are needed. The Bayesian approach would require either (i) numerical judgments that can be interpreted as probabilities; or (ii) ordinal rankings of events, namely a qualitative probability relation (in the sense of de Finetti) over sets of theories, from which a probability measure might be inferred.
Ranking any two theories in terms of their plausibility is not a simple task. Reasoners may find that they do not have very clear "more plausible than" relations in their minds. Yet, if the reasoner has to make a prediction and to justify it, she is asked, at least implicitly, to rank theories. By contrast, quantifying the plausibility by a probability measure or judging which of two subsets of theories is more plausible than the other are much harder cognitive tasks. Moreover, these are tasks that are not necessary for providing a reasoned prediction. Hence, in many applications one might be able to come up with rankings that satisfy (1) without having a complete Bayesian model in mind.
The absence of a numerical aggregation over theories might be troublesome should one wish to compute expected predictions. Consider again the comparison with the Bayesian approach. A Bayesian reasoner has a probability measure over the space of theories, and this probability is updated given observations according to Bayes's law. Faced with an instance of a prediction problem, the Bayesian can compute the prediction suggested by each theory, and then compute the average prediction (or a mode prediction) using all theories involved.
This type of aggregation is not possible in our model. Our model suggests a way to select the most plausible theory, but not to aggregate its prediction with the predictions of less plausible theories. But the model does allow to distinguish among the realm of applicability of various theories. When there are several competing theory, the reasoner may generate hybrid theories from them, using different theories on different sub-domains. Since such a combination of theories is a theory, the resulting theory may also included in the model.
The Measurement of Complexity
Our theorem singles out a class of selection criteria that are described by additive combinations of the log-likelihood function and a measure of complexity. This representation is silent on the choice of the latter. Any measure of complexity, and, in fact, any fixed "cost" associated with each theory, can be subtracted from the log likelihood function and used to satisfy our axioms.
The measurement of complexity is not a trivial issue. It is very appealing to use some notion of Kolmogorov's complexity, namely the length of the minimal program that implements a theory. But the minimal description length of a theory gives equal weight to bits that describe the algorithm of the program and to bits that describe arbitrary parameters. For instance, the MDL of the theory y = 1.30972x is much higher than the MDL of the theory y = 2x. For applications to everyday human reasoning, as well as to scientific reasoning in the social sciences, a "simple" parameter such as 2 need not have any privileged status as compared to a "complicated" parameter such as 1.30972. Differently put, if the bits needed to describe 1.30972 were used to encode logical computation steps, one may have a theory that is much more complicated than the linear relationship y = 1.30972x. This suggests that the length of the description of a program in bits, including all numerical parameters, is an intuitive measure of the theory's complexity. 6 A related problem is the dependence of complexity on language. As mentioned above, Goodman's grue-bleen paradox is often taken as a compelling argument that complexity (or simplicity) is a language-dependent concept. This problem was formally discussed in the computer science literature. Indeed, to operationalize the notion of Kolmogorov's complexity, one has to choose a formal language within which theories are described. If a "program" is modeled as a Turing machine, and the latter is described by a sequence of bits describing states, a transition function, and so on, one gets a certain notion of complexity. It will be quite different from the notion one would obtain if a "program" were modeled as, say, a PASCAL program. One may bound the difference between the complexity of theories as measured in different languages: the difference will be uniformly bounded by the complexity of the program that translates from one language to another. But such a formal bound may not be of great consolation in practical problems. For example, if a reasoner is trying to predict a time series in economics, it may make a big difference whether her language has polynomials or trigonometric functions as primitives. Specifically, cyclical patterns will be much "simpler" and much more obvious to detect in the latter case than in the former.
The dependence on language is mitigated by the argument that human beings have evolved to find certain concepts as more natural, or primitive, than others, and that, due to evolutionary considerations, people would tend to agree on what is "simple" much more than one would predict based on logic alone. The validity of such an argument notwithstanding, it does not allow us to pinpoint a single language that is the most natural to use. In fact, it stands to reason that, despite many interpersonal commonalities, simplicity may remain a subjective notion. Within certain bounds, the choice of language and the ranking of simplicity may differ across individuals, may change with culture and education, and so forth.
Descriptive Interpretation
The focus of this paper is on a normative interpretation of the problem of selecting theories. That is, we ask what is the "right" way to select theories given evidence. This question is of interest to philosophy of science, statistics, and machine learning. But the same problem can be posed with a more descriptive flavor, namely, asking how do people tend to select theories. As a description of reality, the problem is encountered in psychology, economics, cognitive science, and related disciplines.
Other things being equal, one should expect people to prefer theories with more explanatory power to theories with less. A theory that provides good fit, or that has a relatively high likelihood value, is likely to be considered more compelling by most people. This applies not only to "theories" that are given as well-defined statistical models, but also to various claims and suppositions that people make in everyday reasoning.
At the same time, people also tend to prefer simpler theories to more complex ones, other things held constant. This descriptive claim dates to Wittgenstein's tractatus at the latest. He writes, "The procedure of induction consists in accepting as true the simplest law that can be reconciled with our experiences." (Wittgenstein, 1922, 6.363) .
One may argue that people's preference for simplicity has evolved from the need not to overfit data. To caricaturize the argument, one may claim that hyper-rational species, who have no preference for simplicity, are likely to die out because of their inability to effectively learn the environment they live in. Thus, one may argue that preference for simplicity is not necessarily a result of bounded rationality; it is a guarantee against systematic overfitting.
Taking preference for goodness of fit and for simplicity as given, one might wonder how do people trade them off. Our model can be interpreted as a description of this process. Under this interpretation, the axioms should be read as approximations to the judgments that people tend to make. To the extent that these approximations are reasonable, the resulting representation can approximate the results of the reasoning process people go through. The theorem can then be read as stating, "A reasoner who tends to satisfy the axioms in her selection between theories can be described as if she had a statistical model in mind, and a measure of complexity for each theory, such that she selects the theory that maximizes the difference between the logarithm of the likelihood function and the complexity measure." 7 With this interpretation, it would appear that techniques common in statistics and in machine learning may not be very far from the intuitive selection process that people go through in everyday reasoning. In other words, 7 Clearly, this is in line with the classical decision-theoretic derivations of maximization of utility or of expected utility. To quote the most remarkable example, Savage (1954) shows that a decision maker whose preferences between pairs of uncertain act satisfies certain consistency axioms can be described as if she had a utility function and a probability measure, such that her choices were led by the subjective expected utility maximization. This "as if" description does not require that the decision maker be aware of the utility function or the probability measure. A similar interpretation can be applied to our result.
to the extent that our axioms are a valid description of people's reasoning, model selection criteria such as AIC or MDL can be viewed as formal models of informal reasoning that is followed, partially and imperfectly, by laypeople in non-scientific set-ups.
The axiomatic derivation of (1) can also be used to define concepts such as "likelihood" and "simplicity". In many applications having to do with economic and political events, a statistical model is not given a-priori. The same applies to measures of complexity. Our axiomatic derivation may serve as a way to define these concepts, and even to calibrate them. For example, suppose that our reasoner is unsure whether she prefers a complexity measure that counts all the bits needed to describe a theory, or just the number of parameters needed to single it out from a given class of theories. That is, one may be unsure about one's subjective measure of complexity. The axioms on the rankings {% I } I may serve as a guide for calibration: providing answers to (potentially hypothetical) ranking questionnaires, one may find the values v, w that reflect one's preferences over theories.
Appendix: Proofs and Related Analysis
A basic result
We will rely on the following result, which appears in Schmeidler (2001, 2003) . To state it, we first define a matrix v : A × X → R to be diversified if there are no elements a, b, c, d ∈ A with b, c, d 6 = a and λ, µ, θ ∈ R 
, Furthermore, in this case the matrix v is unique in the following sense: v and u both satisfy ( * * ) iff there are a scalar λ > 0, a matrix β : A × X → R with identical rows (i.e., with constant columns) such that u = λv + β.
Proof of Theorem 1
The strategy of the proof is as follows. We define a set of auxiliary relations, {% 0 I } I on A, interpreted as follows: a % 0 I b suggests that the observations contained in I are at least as probably under a than under b. Thus, if we were to ignore complexity considerations or other a-priori biases for one theory over the other, we would expect a to be more plausible than b given I. The relation % 0 I will correspond to the summation of the v entries in our representation. That is, a % 0 I b will turn out to be equivalent to
which is the numerical representation we seek if the w's are all set to zero. The first step in the proof consists of showing that the relations {% 0 I } I satisfy the conditions of the Theorem ??. This identifies the matrix v up to the transformations allowed by Theorem ??, namely, up to addition of constants to columns and multiplication of the entire matrix by a positive number. We fix one such representing matrix v. This step does not make use of axiom A5.
The next step in the proof is to show that for every two theories a, b there exists a number α ab , with α ba = −α ab , such that, for every I, a % I b iff
which is the desired representation for the case of two theories. Finally, the we wish to prove that for each theory a there exists a number w(a) such that, for every a, b, α ab = w(a) − w(b).
4.2.1
Step 1: The matrix v Proof: If not, b % J+2I a, and then by defining K = L = J + I and Lemma 4: For a, b ∈ A and I ∈ D, the following are equivalent:
Proof: We prove that (i)⇒(iii)⇒(ii)⇒(i). Since (iii)⇒(ii) is obvious, only two steps are needed.
To prove that (i)⇒(iii), assume that a ∼
To prove that (ii)⇒(i), assume that for every J ∈ D we have a Proof: We show that (i) is equivalent to each of (ii), (iii), and (iv). We begin with (i)⇔(ii). If (i) holds, then (ii) holds for k = 1. Conversely, 
We therefore conclude that {% 
Furthermore, the matrix v is unique in the following sense: v and u both satisfy ( * ) iff there are a scalar λ > 0, a matrix β : A × X → R with identical rows (i.e., with constant columns) such that u = λv + β. We fix a particular matrix v for the rest of the existence proof.
Step 2: Representation for pairs of theories
In order to uniquely identify the constants α ab such that, for every I,
and to further find a vector w such that α ab = w(a) − w(b), we need to use A5. (See the following sub-section for examples illustrating the difficulties one encounters in the absence of A5.) Fix a, b ∈ A. Given matrix v, define Using this notation, the representation we seek is
Choose I ∈ D with a ∼ I b. Define
Define also α ab = −α ba . We wish to show that this α ab satisfies (4).
Proof: Let there be given J ∈ D. Consider K = I +J. By A5, there exists
Since a
. We now separate the three cases.
(ii) In this case, v ab (J) = v ab (I) and it follows that v ab (J 0 ) = 0 and
Finally, we note that, given the matrix v, α ab and α ba are unique. Moreover, if u = λv + β also satisfies ( * * ), the constants α ab u corresponding to u is α ab u = λα ab .
Step 3: Representation for all theories
Given v satisfying ( * * ), (α ab ) a,b∈A are defined as above. Consider a triple a, b, c ∈ A. Let I satisfy a ∼ I b ∼ I c. Then, by Lemma 11,
Summing up, and noticing that, for every a, b, c and every I,
we obtain that
Fix a ∈ A and set w(a) = 0. For b 6 = a define w(b) = w(a) − α ab . Thus,
For b, c 6 = a, observe that
Hence, for all a, b ∈ A,
Clearly, the vector w is unique up to a shift by an additive constant, leaving the differences w(a) − w(b) = α ab unchanged. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Necessity and Counter-Examples
The theorem does not provide an exact characterization of the collections of relations {% I } I∈D that satisfy A1-A5. While axioms A1-A3 are clearly necessary for the representation ( * ), A4 and A5 are not. As shown in Theorem 2, A4 holds only if the matrix v is diversified. Correspondingly, if {% I } I∈D satisfy A1-A5, the resulting matrix v will also be diversified.
However, not every diversified v will guarantee that the relations {% I } I∈D defined by v and a vector w via ( * ) will also satisfy A5. In fact, the matrixvector pairs (v, w) that guarantee A5 as well are precisely those that satisfy the following condition: Adding diversity of v and (v, w)-solvability, one may obtain a version of Theorem 1 which is a precise characterization. Since the main point of the theorem from a conceptual viewpoint is the sufficiency result, and since it is also the less trivial direction, we chose to omit this condition from the statement of the theorem, leaving it with only one implication.
To see that (v, w)-solvability is not too restrictive, consider the following condition: for every a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ∈ A there are x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ∈ X such that all the numbers {w(a i ), v(a i , x j )} i,j≤3 are rational (or, to be precise, generate only rational ratios).
However, dropping A5, our result may not hold. In the following, we retain the following notation from the proof: given {% I } I , the relations {% We first show that in the absence of A5 uniqueness may fail. That is, the representation is not unique. Using the representation, we know that {% I } I∈D satisfy A1-A3, and A4 can readily be verified. Clearly, A5 is violated in this example. ¤ Second, the following example shows that without A5 representation as in (1) Similarly, w 0 (b) − w 0 (a) < 0 implies the existence of I 6 = 0 with v ab (I) ∈ (w 0 (b) − w 0 (a), 0) and the same conclusion follows.
To conclude the proof we need to verify that {% I } I∈D satisfy A1-A4. In the presence of only two alternatives, A1 only means completeness, which is directly verified from the definition. To see that A2 holds, assume that I, J, K, L are given, with I + J = K + L. 
